This interview is a product of the Kurdish Peace Institute in Qamishlo, which provides decision-makers and the public with locally-rooted, actionable information on critical issues facing northeast Syria, the region, and the world. The interview has been translated from Arabic and lightly edited for clarity. 

Kurdish Peace Institute: Thank you for your time and insights. First, could you provide our readers with some background about yourself, the Northern Democratic Brigade, and its place within the SDF? 

Abu Omar al-Idlibi: The Syrian people went out in peaceful protest in 2011. Eventually, we had to be armed to defend ourselves against the oppressor regime which confronted these protests with live bullets, so we resorted to taking up arms like others did.

The 2011 revolution was similar to the 2004 uprising in Qamishli and Hasakah. Both were faced with live bullets, but the 2004 revolution didn’t get support from other Syrian governorates, and the former regime was able to suppress it. However, the 2011 uprising was a comprehensive Syrian revolution and all components were involved in it.

The purpose of armament was protection against being killed. After the revolution became armed, we were surprised that some extremists entered Idlib from Turkey. As Turkey was their biggest supporter, they entered Idlib from Harem and Bab al Hawa. With enough money and arms, they were able to gain power.

Starting in 2013, we fought ISIS. ISIS reached Idlib and we defeated them. They sent car bombs — I myself was hurt once, in Darkosh. Jabhat al Nusra were the biggest supporters of ISIS. They were neutral on the surface, but would secretly support ISIS behind the scenes.

After ISIS was defeated, Jabhat al Nusra took their weapons and became an enormous force in Idlib. They started to fight against patriotic revolutionary factions there. Ultimately, our group had to withdraw to Afrin because we had no support — unlike Jabhat al Nusra, which was supported by Qatar and Turkey.

We were welcomed by the YPG and YPJ, the PYD, and the people of Afrin. This was mainly because we shared a similar belief in a secular, civil state.

From the beginning, the SDF was composed of revolutionary factions, Kurdish factions, and other factions representing minorities — I don’t like that word, minorities, but this is how it is known in Syria. We announced the establishment of the SDF in 2015. I was actually the one who announced its founding. This was the beginning of our joint campaign against ISIS.

After defeating ISIS, we saw that the military aspect of our campaign alone was not enough. We entered the phase of establishing the Autonomous Administration after announcing the victories against ISIS. We were able to liberate areas like Tal Rifaat, Manbij, Sarrin, areas around Kobani and Afrin, and more.

When Turkey attacked Afrin, we resisted for around 50 days. I considered it as an epic of resistance against a NATO army. Many of our fighters were martyred. We did our best to prevent the occupation of Afrin but eventually we were ordered to withdraw to Manbij, and then to Raqqa. Now we are here in Raqqa.

You described conflicts between your group and Jabhat al Nusra early in the war. Of course, Jabhat al Nusra would go on to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which took power in Damascus last year and formed the transitional government that exists today. What was your reaction to HTS’ advance? What is your assessment of the ability of a government with this background to govern a country as politically, ethnically and religiously diverse as Syria? 

This question is very vast. Our dispute with them is not against any individuals, but against their ideology. Their ideology of governance is not similar to ours. All the world thinks that Idlib is a hotbed of extremism, but it is not. The people of Idlib are decent. I consider Idlib, like Afrin, to be colonized by Islamist factions that took control with support, unfortunately, from states that are close to America and Britain. The Syrian people know that Turkey and Qatar support Jabhat al Nusra and extremist factions. The leadership of Qatar supports Hamas as well as Jabhat al Nusra.

This ideology is inapplicable on the ground in Syria. We fought them. We were surprised by the power and support they had, until they changed the minds of many people over there [Idlib and the regions they are in]. We didn’t want to cause more bloodshed. That’s why we decided to withdraw to Afrin.

That moment [HTS’ arrival in Damascus] was not the outcome of a military victory. We know it was an outcome of intelligence agreements between the U.K., Turkey and Russia…This question should be asked to the U.S. and the U.K.: Is political Islam applicable in Syria? Especially given that Syria is known for its diversity, with components like Druze, Alawites, Kurds, Yezidis, and others? Will these people accept this kind of political governance? Even the moderate Sunni Muslim? If I had agreed with them, I wouldn’t have come from Idlib to here. I am a Sunni Muslim, and I stand with all religious communities. I prefer the Islam that gets along well with everyone and is for everyone, not the type that doesn’t accept pluralism.

So, frankly, we were surprised. Would the U.S. and U.K. really reward ISIS after we fought them for 7 or 8 years and filled our prisons with their radical fighters? To deliver them to power in Damascus? Is this a reward? We sacrificed martyrs to fight against ISIS.

I want to ask this: If there was no SDF, where would ISIS be now? It would’ve taken Syria, Iraq and other important regional countries…Without us, would Ahmed al-Sharaa have ever reached power?

Negotiations on the integration of the SDF and DAANES into Syria’s new military and new government have gained new life in recent weeks. From your perspective, what progress has been made so far? In particular, what points of agreement are there on military and security integration? On what points do the SDF and the transitional government still disagree? 

They need us. They need to be integrated with us, not the other way around. We don’t need them. There is an American objective here. The Americans tell us: go for integration. We don’t have a problem with integration, but it must be done with American guarantees.

Our region must be kept the same, controlled by us. We will not allow any strangers to enter it, like those Uighur and Turkistani fighters.

The integration process will require a long time — until there is confidence between us and them, until their perspective changes. We will see where this confidence will take us to. We will integrate, but with extreme caution, and, again, in the presence of guarantees from the U.S. and some Arab countries.

The integration must be based on the March 10 agreement. Terrorist organizations should be expelled. The agreement should be participatory and inclusive of all Syrians. There should be a new government that includes all sects and a military council that consists of both the SDF and the new government. That is to say, they should change themselves. Joining the Coalition must be evidence of that change – there is even a possibility that they might fight their own component forces. We don’t have any problems with any one person as long as they change their approach.

The SDF will integrate as three brigades and three independent divisions to assure the safety of the region. There will be leaders from the SDF in the Ministry of Defense. We will have our personnel involved in the work of a new government – not the transitional government that exists now. And of course, there will be participation in ministries and civil affairs all over Syria. I am speaking of integration and participation for all Syria. If they want something from us, they should give us something in exchange.

You cite U.S. diplomacy, specifically U.S. guarantees on integration, as something that can facilitate progress.  How do you assess U.S. diplomatic engagement with Syria and the SDF integration file? Do you believe the U.S. ought to be doing anything differently?

Each state has its own interests. The fall of the former regime was not because of Jabhat al-Nusra or any military force, but because of Israeli attacks and strikes that limited Iran’s influence in the region.

[HTS] was only the leading faction because it is an extremist faction that was capable of removing Iran from the region. It succeeded in doing this. Sharaa’s presence in governing Syria is in Israel’s favor, but only temporarily – Israel won’t allow the existence of extremists close to its borders.

I expect, after receiving assurances from Americans – I want to look at it from a positive perspective, so let me be a bit positive – that Sharaa, as a person, can change. The proof is his agreement with Mazloum Abdi first, and then signing on to combat the terrorism of the factions that work with him second. He also has given preliminary approval of decentralization. There are positive steps regarding that. Sharaa’s closeness to the Coalition and the U.S. has reassured us, somehow. I expect there will be acceleration in the integration process in the upcoming months in a way that suits the SDF.

You’ve spoken at length in this conversation, and in your commentary on social media, about the importance of pluralism for Syria’s future. Some actors, in particularly, Turkey, have sought to create a narrative that the SDF is an exclusively Kurdish project or a separatist project. As a leader in the SDF who is neither Kurdish nor from northeast Syria, how do you respond to those claims? What do you have to say about the degree of pluralism and coexistence that exists in northeast Syria?

Turkey’s problem is not with the SDF, but with every Kurdish person who takes up arms. This problem is a historical one with the Kurdish people as a whole. If there is one Kurd in Daraa, Turkey will go to fight him there.

I didn’t understand the injustice against Kurds until I started to fight alongside them. I see Turkey as a country that doesn’t accept pluralism, even though a quarter of Turkey’s population at least are Kurds. The Kurdish cause is very broad. The problem is with Sykes-Picot. If Sykes-Picot had given the Kurds their country, there wouldn’t be a Kurdish cause or a PKK. But this agreement divided Kurdistan into four countries and wronged the Kurds.

If there were only ten Kurdish fighters in the SDF, Turkey would still fight them. But the SDF includes all components from all over Syria — not only the people of this region [under the control of the DAANES], but also people from Idlib, Aleppo, Damascus, and  Lattakia.

The Kurds proved their persistence and organized work in the past ten years. They proved their worthiness to lead. For example, Mazloum Abdi has more political and military experience than I do. Each one of us in the SDF has his own group. Mazloum Abdi was not appointed as our general commander because he was Kurdish, but because of his competence. We overcame many obstacles thanks to his statesmanship. Turkey does not refer to the SDF and Autonomous Administration as Kurdish or Arab, but as the PKK. So, am I PKK? No, even though  I’m one of the founders of the SDF.

The problem between Kurds and Turks is a historical one, but today, I guess there are assurances. There were steps towards reconciliation recently, because Turkey has sensed the danger of excluding the Kurds from decision-making in Turkey, and is trying now to integrate Kurds and Turks by communicating with Mr. Ocalan. I’m optimistic about this.

Turkey has that problem in their own state. Here we are able to give the Kurds their full rights in the upcoming period. It is a shame to teach foreign languages in Syrian schools but not Kurdish, especially given that the Kurdish people are an ancient and crucial people in Syria…It is irrational to force a Kurdish individual to serve in a Syrian Arab Army – this is racist.  What would be the problem with calling it the Syrian Arab-Kurdish Republic, for example? This won’t minimize the Arabs. I’m Arab and proud of it, but we should give everyone else their rights, too.

My religion tells me to respect others and to grant them their rights. What they use is not religion, but racism. That is an outcome of 60 years of Baathist dictatorship in Syria. This racism came also from Turkey, particularly the injustice against Kurds.

My dream is a participatory, pluralistic, democratic, civil Syria where the Kurds, and all others, feel that they belong. Unfortunately, Kurds have never felt like they belong in Syria. How can Kurds belong to a state that denies them?

They even say that the president of Syria must be Muslim Sunni. This is the core of racism. Why couldn’t the president be a Syrian Alawite, Christian, or Druze – as long as we elected him, as long as the president is elected by people themselves and not appointed by one person, what does it matter?

Unfortunately, the Assad-era system has not fallen. For me, I see the real day of the fall of the regime as the day when the revolution’s goals will be achieved. I have expressed that idea before. Bashar may have fallen, but the Baath is still there – their authoritarian mindset is still ruling Syria. The people may have changed, but the mindset still exists.

(Photo: Syrian Democratic Forces)