About

Since talks between the government of Turkey and the Kurdish Freedom Movement* were publicized in October 2024, observers have witnessed unprecedented reconciliation, ongoing conflict and political repression, and a rapidly shifting regional landscape.

These negotiations have been conducted with little transparency. They have also taken on a format significantly different both from that of previous rounds of Turkish-Kurdish talks and from those of other peace processes around the world, with the PKK dissolving itself and agreeing to disarm at the beginning of the process in the absence of clear reciprocal steps from the government.

The Turkey – Kurdish Freedom Movement Negotiations Tracker has defined indicators of progress that can be used to measure forward movement on the process. It is intended to be a resource for journalists, academics, non-governmental organizations, and policymakers interested in following steps towards peace.

* This tracker uses ‘Kurdish Freedom Movement’ to refer to the movement inspired by Abdullah Ocalan’s theories that has existed since under the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) structure since 2005. As the PKK has formally dissolved itself and the future structure of other actors in the movement may change, we find this terminology most useful. When referring to a specific statement, action, or individual affiliation, we will use the label that is used in the source material. 

Methodology

There are no formal agreements in place between Turkey and the Kurdish Freedom Movement. As a result, there are no mutually agreed-upon commitments for observers to monitor.

This tracker uses a series of unilateral documents and statements made by the government of Turkey, the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, Abdullah Ocalan, and the Kurdish Freedom Movement to determine the most important issues to track and indicators of progress on those matters. For more information on these unilateral documents and statements, please refer to the Key Documents resource.

The negotiations have been divided into ‘phases’ based on notable developments.

• Phase 0 (April 2024 – September 2024): The alleged start and continuation of secret talks between the government of Turkey, Abdullah Ocalan, and the PKK.
• Phase 1 (October 22, 2024 – February 26, 2025): Public discussions and official meetings between the DEM Party, Ocalan, and the government and political parties begin in the run-up to a formal call for dissolution and disarmament.
• Phase 2 (February 27, 2025 – May 11, 2025): Ocalan formally calls for the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK. Meetings between Ocalan, the DEM Party, and the government continue.
• Phase 3, (May 12, 2025 – present): The PKK announces that it has dissolved itself and will end its armed struggle, in compliance with Ocalan’s recommendations. Meetings between Ocalan, the DEM Party, and the government continue. Steps towards disarmament and parliamentary frameworks begin.

For Phases 0 and 1, please refer to the timeline included on the Peace Process Resource Center page.

For Phase 2 and onward, the tracker measures indicators of progress on the two primary components of Abdullah Ocalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” – the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK and the preparation of an appropriate political and legal framework.

• Dissolution and Disarmament: In the February 27th, 2025 “Call for Peace and Democratic Society,” Abdullah Ocalan said:  “As in the case with any modern community and party whose existence has not been abolished by force, convene your congress to integrate with the state and society voluntarily and make a decision; all groups must lay down their arms and the PKK must dissolve itself.”
  • Positions and Actions: Relevant policy positions and actions related to the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK.
• Legal and Political Framework: Following the “Call for Peace and Democratic Society,” DEM Party Imralı Delegation Member Sırrı Süreyya Önder conveyed the following additional note from Abdullah Ocalan: “Undoubtedly, the laying down of arms and the dissolution of the PKK in practice require the recognition of democratic politics and a legal framework.” Neither Ocalan nor the DEM Party clarified what this framework should be. Again, unilateral documents and statements suggest areas where progress should be monitored. This tracker will monitor the following indicators:
  • Parliamentary Commission: After its first round of meetings with Turkey’s major political parties in January, the DEM Party Imrali Delegation reported that there was a consensus that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey should take on a leading role in the process. Ocalan and the KCK leadership both lent support to this view. On May 18th, just after the PKK’s 12th Congress, Devlet Bahceli proposed the establishment of a 100-member parliamentary commission. Numan Kurtulmus said the next day that “The place where the issue will be discussed, both politically and in terms of preparing the legal ground, is the Turkish Grand National Assembly. All political parties will support the process.”
    • Positions and Actions: Statements by political leaders related to the establishment of the commission and actions taken towards its establishment.
    • Commission Activity: If and when the commission is established, this indicator will track its activity. This may overlap with other indicators of progress, particularly those that require legal or constitutional changes.
  • Constitution: Turkey’s current constitution creates a highly centralized state and contains provisions that can be used to criminalize and restrict Kurdish identity. On February 14th, 2025, the DEM Party called for “constitutional guarantees of the democratic and political rights of the Kurdish people” and a “pluralistic and participatory comprehensive construction process that will pave the way for democratization in Turkey.”
    • Positions and Actions: Policy positions of actors related to constitutional change.
  • Political Prisoners: One impediment to democratic politics is the imprisonment of tens of thousands of predominantly Kurdish people, including current and former elected officials, on charges related to the Kurdish issue (including accusations of PKK support or affiliation and charges related to participation in pro-Kurdish demonstrations, parties, civil society organizations, media outlets, and other institutions).
    • New Arrests: New arrests of Kurdish politicians, activists, and others on charges related to the Kurdish issue.
    • Releases: Releases of individuals in prison on charges related to the Kurdish issue.
    • Legal Changes: Changes to laws commonly used to criminalize Kurdish politics.
    • ECtHR Decisions and Implementation: Implementation of ECtHR decisions related to the status of Kurdish political prisoners.
  • Trustee Appointments: Another impediment to democratic politics is the systematic disenfranchisement of millions of Kurdish voters through the appointment of trustees to municipalities won by pro-Kurdish parties.
    • Number of Disenfranchised DEM Voters: The number of voters who supported successful DEM Party candidates in municipalities to which trustees were appointed.
    • New Trustee Appointments: Appointments of trustees to municipalities where the DEM Party won in 2024.
    • Municipalities Returned to Elected Leaders: Trustee-led municipalities returned to their elected mayors.
    • Legal Changes to Trustee Framework: Any legal changes that reform or remove the framework under which trustees can be appointed to municipalities.

All information is taken from open sources, including the official websites and social media accounts of leaders, political parties, and institutions; Turkish state-affiliated media; Kurdish Freedom Movement-affiliated media; and independent Turkish and Kurdish media.

Access the Data

Disarmament and Dissolution (updated July 11, 2025)

Legal and Political Framework (updated July 11, 2025)