An estimated eight to 10 million Kurds live in Iran, constituting about 10% of the country’s population and about 25% of the 40 million Kurds in the Middle East. They are concentrated in the northwestern regions of the country, including the provinces of Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah and Ilam. Kurds refer to these regions as Rojhelat, or Eastern Kurdistan.

Successive Iranian governments have denied Kurds their fundamental rights and violently repressed Kurdish dissent. As a result, Kurds in Iran have been at the forefront of anti-regime movements and the pan-Kurdish national struggle for nearly a century.

The first Kurdish state in the region, the short-lived Republic of Kurdistan, was established in Mahabad in 1946. Kurds participated in the uprising against the Shah in the late 1970s; they continued to fight for autonomy against the newly-formed Islamic Republic after other progressive currents in the revolution had been marginalized.

When ISIS attacked Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria in 2014, Iranian Kurds joined their brothers and sisters on front lines from Kirkuk to Kobane. In 2022, the murder of Jina Amini, a Kurdish woman, by Iranian ‘morality police’ sparked Kurdish protests that led to a nation-wide uprising. The slogan of the demonstrations — “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” or Women, Life, Freedom” — has its roots in Kurdish political thought.

Organized Kurdish Opposition

Today, several significant Kurdish opposition parties exist. These groups have waged on-and-off armed campaigns against the Iranian state and engage in political organizing both clandestinely within Iran and openly in exile.

The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) was established in 1945 and is the founding party of the 1946 republic. The Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iran (KDP-I) split from the PDKI over a leadership dispute, but reunited with it in 2022. Komala was founded in 1969 by a group of university students. The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) was founded in 1991. The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) was founded by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2004 when the group restructured and created affiliates for different Kurdish regions.

All major Iranian Kurdish parties demand the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. PDKI, Komala, and PJAK call for Kurdish national rights within a democratic, secular, federal Iran, while PAK calls for the creation of an independent Kurdish state. The parties have expressed interest in collaborating with other opposition groups in Iran and, in particular, with other ethnic minorities.

All have engaged in armed conflict with the Iranian state at various points in their history. In the 2010s, many members of these groups gained further experience and capacity fighting ISIS alongside the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and the Syrian Kurdish YPG/J.

Local and international media reports indicated an uptick in young Kurdish men and women joining armed groups in response to the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising. However, no Iranian Kurdish armed force took direct action against the state this time, likely to avoid inviting further retaliation against protestors. It is unclear the degree to which each party has military forces present in Iran now. In 2023, Iran, Iraq, and the KRG began working together to disarm Iranian Kurdish parties and relocate them far from the Iran-Iraq border.

The Kurdish Factor and the Iran-Israel War

Kurdish opposition parties have responded to the outbreak of conflict between Israel and Iran by reiterating their calls for the fall of the Islamic Republic. KDPI, Komala, PAK and PJAK each laid final blame for the war on the state’s authoritarian and aggressive policies. Parties differed in their assessment of Israel’s actions. PAK expressed support for Israeli strikes on Iranian targets. PJAK condemned both sides for the “the high number of civilian casualties, especially women and children, in Iran and Israel during these attacks.”

Kurds are known to be the best-organized segment of the Iranian opposition. In any prolonged war, they are likely to take action to ensure the stabilization and protection of their regions. However, several factors may cause them to proceed with caution.

First, Kurdish regions of Iran are heavily militarized due to their location near the country’s borders and the Iranian state’s fears of Kurdish militancy and political organization. This has the dual impact of chilling any potential opposition mobilization and attracting Israeli attacks. Since the conflict began, Iranian authorities have threatened to punish all critics of the government’s war effort, while Israel struck a hospital in Kermanshah.

Second, Kurds have little incentive to move against the state first. There is no guarantee that other actors will follow or support them. Israel’s indiscriminate bombing campaign is creating a “rally ‘round the flag” effect among many Iranians who might otherwise oppose the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, mainstream opposition groups that have used the war as an opportunity to advance their case against the Islamic Republic include supporters of the deposed monarchy — which was also violently opposed to Kurdish rights. In the 2022 uprising, when Kurdish and other ethnic minority regions bore the brunt of state repression, some Persian opposition groups and leaders minimized their concerns and whitewashed Jina Amini’s Kurdish identity.

Third, rapid Kurdish engagement might attract foreign intervention that Kurds would be unable to counter from their current position. Turkish far-right leader Devlet Bahceli has already alleged that the real target of Israel’s war is not Iran but Turkey. If Kurds take action before they are capable of defending their gains, Turkey may intervene — either directly or indirectly through its ally Azerbaijan and Iran’s large Azeri population — to quash their efforts.

The Regional Kurdish Context

The positions of other Kurdish actors in the Middle East, particularly the KRG and the PKK, may shape and be shaped by what Kurds in Iran can achieve. Neither is likely to take radical action now, but both may hope to influence any successful Iranian Kurdish movement that might come into existence.

The KRG does not want to be drawn into a regional war. Iran could harm the region’s economy and severely destabilize the region with strikes. With Iranian Kurdish opposition parties largely based on Iraqi Kurdish soil, the region has both a target on its back and a degree of leverage over these groups’ behavior.

If the KRG believes major Iranian Kurdish gains are unlikely, it may seek to further restrain opposition party activity. Yet if the situation in Iran deteriorates and Kurdish movements gain strength, the KRG will likely use its leverage and connections to win influence in the region.

The PKK, by contrast, may benefit from Israel-Iran confrontation. Turkey is threatened by the prospect of Kurds in Iran taking advantage of a weakened central government as Kurds in Iraq and Syria once did. It also fears that potential outreach to Kurdish groups by either Iran or Israel might include offers of support against Turkey. Turkish leaders are thus incentivized to offer their own Kurdish population a better deal in ongoing peace talks with the PKK if this conflict continues.

The end of the PKK’s war against Turkey could free PJAK to play a more active role in Kurdish politics in Iran. The group has reportedly gained influence in recent years. Many Kurds admire the wider Ocalan-inspired Kurdish movement’s role in the fight against ISIS and its philosophical influence on the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising. PJAK is also the only major Iranian Kurdish party not impacted by the KRG-Iraq-Iran disarmament process.

After PKK founder and leader Abdullah Ocalan called on his organization to disarm and dissolve itself, PJAK claimed that this order would not apply to its forces either. The group stated that it would not fight unless attacked, but would defend Kurdish communities in Iran if necessary. A successful Turkey-PKK peace deal could even allow Turkey to live with, or even work with, Iranian Kurdish political and military entities.

At the same time, the PKK could use PJAK’s existence as a card in negotiations with Turkey, offering the affiliate’s disarmament in exchange for Turkish concessions. In such a case, PJAK’s personnel and supporters may shift to other Kurdish factions.

What’s Next?

Kurdish parties are likely to observe developments and make preparations for how to protect their communities if violence escalates.

Drawing on the lessons of Kurdish experiences in Syria and Iraq, where political divides sometimes impeded the pursuit of national goals, they may attempt to unify objectives and strategies early on. Recent steps towards intra-Kurdish cooperation in Syria and peace in Turkey have dampened the external tensions that might have otherwise hindered unity efforts. Most major opposition parties have similar goals; their statements following the outbreak of clashes also suggest a desire for a united front.

If conflict continues and the state is either unable to control Kurdish regions or unwilling to prioritize their defense, Kurdish groups may take control of local governance without active confrontation, similar to the Syrian Kurdish takeover of cities in the northeast from government forces in 2011-12. In this case, greater underground and semi-underground civil organizing may be prioritized before military preparations and open military action.

In the medium to long term, however, some self-defense capacity will likely be necessary. If state repression increases in tandem with destructive Israeli strikes and deteriorating economic conditions, unrest in Kurdish regions may be inevitable. Even in a scenario where the Islamic Republic falls or is fragmented, a new government or set of predominant opposition groups could be equally nationalist and hostile to Kurdish self-governance — a scenario Kurds remember well from Syria. If they have to hold and defend territory, the best move for Kurdish parties would be to find a way to coordinate and unite armed forces under a shared command structure. The SDF model, which brought several existing armed groups with different ideologies and military cultures together in one framework, could be relevant here.

In any scenario, with Iraqi Kurdish self-rule established and Turkey and Syria both negotiating with their Kurdish communities, Iran is the only state with a Kurdish population to have ruled out any expansion of Kurdish rights altogether. Whether this war escalates or ends, the Kurdish issue will remain a potential source of conflict in Iran until it is resolved.

(Photo: Salar Arkan – سالار ارکان, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)