Hejar Berenji, Representative of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) to the U.S., and Salah Bayaziddi, Representative of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan to the U.S., discussed the formation and goals of Iran’s six-party Kurdish alliance at a moment of uncertainty for Iran and the region.

Iranian Kurdish opposition parties have been active in the country since the 1940s. The Alliance of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan was formed in February 2026 with the goal of “liberating” Iranian Kurdistan and establishing democratic governance within a federal Iran through close political and military coordination. It currently includes the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Free Life Party (PJAK), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Organization of Iranian Kurdistan’s Struggle (Khabat), and Komala Toilers of Kurdistan.

Since the start of the U.S.-Iran war on February 28, 2026, Iranian Kurdish headquarters in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have come under repeated attacks by the Islamic Republic and its Iraqi proxy groups. Arrests, disappearances, and executions of Kurds within Iran’s borders continue.

Alliance Formation and Goals

Speaking to the Kurdish Peace Institute’s Lara Jalal, Hejar Berenji said that the parties have worked on building this alliance for years and all agree on shared democratic objectives.

Salah Bayaziddi added that the values of the alliance include “democracy, human rights, the rights of nations, self-determination, and pluralism.”

“We are open to dialogue with groups that respect the same values as we do, because we have shown that unity is possible even though we have differences in ideology … and in ways that we manage our struggle,” said Berenji.

The representatives outlined the alliance’s three-stage vision for coalition building.

The first stage was “achieving unity among Kurdish political parties”, a goal they argued had been realized through the formation of the alliance.

The second involves building closer coordination with other marginalized national and ethnic groups, including the Baloch and Ahwazi Arabs.

The third is engaging with mainstream opposition actors committed to the same democratic goals.

Berenji added that “anyone in the Iranian opposition that respects the rights of nations within Iranian borders, human rights, and democracy … and the values and fundamentals of spreading and dividing power and wealth throughout that country can be candidates with us to work together.”

The Case for Federalism

“This country has not always been a centralized country. [Centralization] is the new model,” Salah Bayaziddi explained, discussing alternative political futures for Iran.

He pointed to the Islamic Republic’s securitized approach to ethnic minorities in the country’s peripheries.

While at least half of Iran’s population is non-Persian, decision-making remains concentrated in Tehran, while the resources of peripheral regions are used to advance the regime’s political objectives at home and abroad.

Bayaziddi argued that other Iranian ethnic groups also want to take part in the “decision-making” and “budget allocation” process.

Attacks on Kurds Continue as Iran War Winds Down

Since the war broke out, multiple rounds of negotiations have taken place. None has led to a ceasefire that includes Kurds and Kurdistan.

According to Salah Bayaziddi, the Islamic Republic and its proxies have carried out 70 attacks against Kurdish opposition bases in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq since the latest ceasefire was declared.

“Some of these camps are civilian camps under the supervision of the UN,” he added. “This is not coming from strength. It is coming from fear.”

The representatives argued that the regime’s attacks reflect its awareness of the Kurdish movement’s potential, pointing to the Women, Life, Freedom movement that started in Iranian Kurdistan and sparked the largest nationwide protest movement in Iran in decades before gaining international resonance.

They added that Kurdish opposition groups are among the easiest targets because they are geographically closest to Iran, located just across the border, and lack sufficient protection.

“The only opposition group that has managed to stay very close to Iranian borders throughout the last 47 years have been the Kurds,” said Hejar Berenji.

Kurds After the MOU

When asked about the signing of the 14-Point Memorandum of Understanding, Salah Bayaziddi claimed that the regime was “probably cheating the international community,” adding that funds previously generated through deals like the JCPOA were redirected toward Iranian proxies abroad.

Hejar Berenji stated that “with all due respect to American objectives, I think our objectives and our struggle to change the foundations of governance within Iran have been different from those of external forces … We have never relied on external actors at a high level, because relationships between countries can change in international politics.”

“As long as the idea of exporting Islamic Revolution exists, the Middle East will not see peace and stability. With no peace and stability, the regional economy … will always be in danger,” he added.

“The existence of the Iranian regime is built on destabilizing this region. If they don’t do that, they won’t exist anymore.”

Berenji concluded with a message of resistance. “With … ending this war, we will have more room to go back to our original way of fighting for our rights, struggling for our freedom, and demanding our rights. The biggest source of support and hope that we have are the freedom-loving, freedom-respecting Iranians, and in particular the Kurdish nation of Iran, who will push us forward toward this objective.”

Key Takeaways:

• Six major Iranian Kurdish parties have formed an unprecedented alliance around a shared commitment to democracy, federalism, pluralism, and human rights.
• The alliance aims to expand cooperation beyond Kurdistan by building ties with other marginalized communities and democratic opposition groups across Iran.
• Iran’s centralized political system has marginalized non-Persian communities and that a federal democratic system offers a path to greater stability and inclusion.
• Kurdish opposition parties view continued attacks on their positions as evidence of the regime’s fear of organized Kurdish political movements and their potential to drive political change.
• The representatives stressed that meaningful change in Iran must come from internal organization and mobilization.
• The panelists contended that past sanctions relief primarily benefited the regime, not the Iranian people, and warned that future relief would likely have similar outcomes.